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## Moscow's Real Weakness

Regardless of the action of the Russians in Hungary, the revolts of the satellites have left the Soviet H. in a weaker military position, according to some expert confine

The revolts cast the most serious doubts upon the observers. reliability of Soviet army units in case of war against the West. Many of the Hungarian army units sent in to quell the Budapest revolts actually joined the rebels

or passed arms and ammunition to them.

There were reports that some of the Soviet troops didn't react as they were expected to do. It was only when tough Mongolian troops were brought in from eastern Asia that the crackdown began to function effectively.

So the Russians cannot trust local communists and communist armies to run eastern Europe. Yet they wouldn't dare tie down hundreds of thousands of their own troops to control the satellite peoples.

In short, they seem to lack the force to hold down the entire red empire as was done in Stalin's day. This a is only one of the many developments which make the soul-searching in Kremlin circles painful at this time.

## **The Limitations Of Words**

In some circles in the United States there seems today to be an uncommon faith in the power of words to order the affairs of a troubled world.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000901370090-1

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000901370090-1 tional morality, for justice in the world. Many times we use our voice as we should. Undoubtedly there are times when we do not. But we have to remember that, however large we may loom on the world horizon, there are things we cannot bring about d merely by uttering words. It has been said, for instance, that the United h States could have prevented any shipment of arms to Egypt from the Soviet Union merely by telling the Kremlin not to do it. It is really as simple as that? Such a warning is only as effective as the stuff  $\frac{a}{N}$ 

Russia ignored the warning, as it very likely would to have done? We could not very well say we would blockade o the shipments, for that is an act of war which might bring broad consequences. We could hardly threaten war itself over such an issue. We could have said we would send equal arms to Israel, but this would have speeded an arms race and the very sort of divisions in the Middle East we were trying to avoid.

that backs it up. What were we prepared to do if o

It is also being said that we will not be doing our el part until we "insist" that Egypt and the Arab lands to sit down at the council table and negotiate a genuine

peace with Israel.

Again, is that all there is to it? Suppose the Arab people refuse. Then what do we do? We can embarrass them with all kinds of public censure, but we cannot compel them to negotiate if they do not wish to. We could, of course, take them over and negotiate in their stead, but that hardly seems a formula for

lasting Middle Eastern peace. It is understandable when ritical situations arise that there be a demand for action and strong wordsor words alone if action is not possible. But we have r to face the fact that there are situations for which no v words are truly adequate and the only really effective s

action is war.

People who argue as if the could blow down the Kremlin walls are not facing the brutal facts in a tough world.

## Unpredictable Explosion

Here and there complaints are being voiced  $\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{n} \\ \mathbf{v} \end{bmatrix}$ against the Central Intelligence Agence, on the scon that it had no advance notice of the Hungarian revolt.

The CIA ought not to be above criticism when it M is warranted any more than any other governmental magency. But its performance cannot be measured by st unreasonable standards.

All the evidence we have from Europe so far is pe that neither the Soviet Union nor the Hungarians themselves anticipated the rebellion which erupted in stu- He dent riots in late October.

The reports indicate the uprising was a sponta-th neous conflagration which was fed by a succession will be a succession w of repressive measures by Soviet armed forces attempt-do ing to cope with the outbreak. It gathered momentum from steadily until suddenly, to the surprise of Hungarians and Russians alike, a full-fledged revolt was in prog-lo

Since on the morning of Oct. 22 no one in the be Kremlin itself knew what was about to happen-and th the Hungarians were not planning anything—it seems R a trifle unrealistic to demand of the CIA that it should Pe have known what was going to develop.

Let's chide the CIA or any other agency for not the doing a job. But let's not require that it foresee the in unforeseeable.